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Can an American Entrepreneur Work for a Japanese Company and Be Effective 
and Happy? 
One way to answer the question "Can an American Entrepreneur Work for a Japanese 
Company and be Effective and Happy?" would be to quote a former first lady and "just say no." 
But even if "no" is the concise and absolute answer, the question is worth exploring. 
Let us first define the word "entrepreneur." The dictionary tells us it is derived from the 
French word "entrepredre," which means an undertaking with risk. The entrepreneur is always 
willing to take significant risk in order to achieve his objective; he is also capable of using trail-
blazing or non-conforming strategies in the quest. These are not characteristics easily 
accommodated by large corporations, and especially not by large Japanese corporations. 
So what behavior is characteristic of an entrepreneur? Let me offer my experience as the 
founder of Materials Research Corporation (MRC), a premier supplier of thin film materials and 
the film process equipment for the semiconductor industry, as an example. As the semiconductor 
industry spread throughout the free world, I expanded the business by opening sales and service 
companies in several European countries as well as a manufacturing plant in Toulouse, France. 
Doing business in Japan, however, was not as straightforward because until 1980 foreign 
corporations could not organize a Japanese operation unless it was a Japanese majority-owned 
joint venture. Since my company had a considerable amount of proprietary technology, this was 
not acceptable to me. Therefore, for many years we were limited to working with distribution 
and sales agents in Japan. 
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An American Entrepreneur in Japan 
Finally in 1980, when the Japanese government changed its laws and permitted foreign 
companies to incorporate and operate in Japan as independent entities, I went to Japan to 
organize a company. My plan was to skip the usual mating-dance sequence of sales, service, 
assembly and manufacturing, and go straight to the manufacturing of semiconductor process 
equipment in Japan. Not knowing how to proceed, I went first to the American embassy in 
Tokyo and then to the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) for 
assistance. Neither organization was very helpful. The U.S. embassy staff, although willing to 
be of assistance, were ineffective, and MITI was hardly interested in helping to bring an 
unknown small American company to Japan. 
Uncertain as to my next step, I decided to advertise my plight and arranged a press 
conference at the American Club in Tokyo. Because Japan has so many newspapers to fill each 
day, I actually attracted about 30 Japanese reporters. After the usual preliminaries I made the 
following statement: "What I have, your growing semiconductor industry needs, and what you 
have, I need. So don't put up roadblocks, hang welcome signs." The next day several Japanese 
newspapers reported that there was an escaped American lunatic in Tokyo asking to be 
welcomed to Japan. 
Three prefectures, all on the island of Kyushu, or what the Japanese call "Silicon Island" 
(similar to our Silicon Valley in California), wrote to me extending welcomes. I visited them and 
in Oita prefecture found the perfect chemistry for my manufacturing venture. With the assistance 
of Oita's Governor Hiramatsu, I promptly signed a lease for a plot of land not far from Oita 
airport. I then asked members of the Governor's staff how I might borrow the necessary funds 
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for construction of a manufacturing plant. I discovered that if my company were a Japanese 
corporation I could go to the Japan Development Bank (JDB) for financing. So with 
documentation of the incorporation of my company as Nihon MRC in Japan and my agreement 
with Oita prefecture, I went to the JDB in Tokyo to apply for a loan. After six months of 
unbelievable bureaucratic activity, my company was granted the first JDB loan ever given to a 
foreign-owned Japanese corporation. The amount of the loan was inconsequential; what was 
important was the recognition and stamp of approval from the Japanese government. 
As MRC continued to grow, so did the demands for capital, particularly in areas of 
research and development. I soon realized the company could do well only if it were sold to a 
considerably larger company with a strong capital base. In seeking a merger partner for the 
company, I had two bidders, a Swiss company and Sony. I decided on Sony. Technologically 
Sony was a superb fit because it uses thin films in almost all of its products, and this was my 
company's expertise. In particular, Sony has a semiconductor business of almost two billion 
dollars, manufactures compact discs by the millions, and produces magnetic tapes, all using thin 
films. 
My initial plan was to sell the company and then walk away from the entire enterprise. 
However, Akio Morita personally insisted that I sign a contract joining Sony's senior 
management for five years. Part of the reason apparently was that I carried a certain prestige 
value as a reasonably well-known American scientist, and this was the first acquisition by Sony 
of a foreign firm. In turn, one of my contractual stipulations was that I would not be the CEO of 
the subsidiary I sold them or of any Sony operation. I wanted to explore new fields in the Sony 
business. Therefore, on paper I became Vice Chairman of Engineering and Manufacturing for 
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Sony Electronics Inc. (USA), with responsibility for 26 U.S. factories engaged in consumer 
electronics production. In reality, however, those factories reported directly to the Tokyo office. 
From the outset of the employment contract, my personal commitment was to become a 
significant, contributing member of the Sony management team. Everything started well enough; 
I was somewhat of a celebrity and began my career with Sony in good spirits and with a sense of 
adventure. However, two incidents occurred shortly after the acquisition that established the 
boundary conditions for my future with Sony. 
Japanese and American magazines, newspapers and television stations all interviewed me 
when the acquisition was announced. After all, the world-renowned Sony Corporation had 
acquired the company that I had founded. I then left on an extended tour of Sony, Japan. When I 
arrived at Tokyo corporate headquarters, I was invited into a conference room by my hosts and 
asked if I had seen a recent interview with me on Japanese television. It was a 60 Minutes-type 
interview where I was asked a question and, depending upon the answer desired by the 
interviewer, my response was cut and the meaning modified. For example, when asked what I 
thought of nemawashi or consensus-type management, I answered: "It is quite cumbersome, but I 
am impressed with how well it seems to work in Japan." My answer was cut after "It is quite 
cumbersome." With this and other comments, I came across as being distinctly unappreciative of 
Japanese-style management. My Sony colleagues were obviously distressed by the interview and 
the senior member present advised me with great seriousness that in the future I must get 
approval from the appropriate public relations person in Tokyo headquarters for all press 
contacts. I answered: "I will speak very slowly because I do not want there to be any 
misunderstanding. I have spoken in public for 30 years. During this time I have represented 
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myself, my company and my country. I have done this without any censorship whatsoever, and I 
do not intend to begin now." The die for my Sony career was beginning to be cast in stone. 
From Tokyo I went to the Sony central research center in Yokohama which was very 
impressive. When I complemented the research director, who was also a member of the Sony 
board of directors, on the broad scope and complexity of the projects being pursued at the 
laboratories, he said, "You cannot appreciate in so short a time period all that we are doing, so I 
will recommend that you be immediately transferred to Yokohama for two years to achieve a 
better understanding of our work." I was totally stunned by his statement because I had not been 
hired by Sony to be a member of its research organization. 
Clearly, this was a person who had worked for the same company from the day he 
finished school. In actuality, probably every executive in the Sony organization with the 
exception of Norio Ohga who had a brief singing career has been with the company from the day 
he left school. It is impossible for such "life-time" employees to imagine that someone can come 
to Sony from another company with meaningful experience and actually know something of 
value. This insider-versus-outsider attitude is prevalent throughout the organization, and is a 
form of the "not-invented-here" syndrome. While this "not-invented-here" attitude also exists in 
the United States, it is much less prevalent because there is so much company-to-company 
movement by executives and professionals. 
How Japanese Corporations Deal with their Subsidiaries 
When Sony acquired my company as a subsidiary, we had a manufacturing plant in Oita, 
a service center in Tokyo, and several sales offices throughout Japan. We had decided to find a 
5 
Japanese national to be the overall manager for our operations in Japan. We retained a search 
firm in Tokyo which proposed a number of excellent candidates for the position. However, when 
we discussed the subject with the Sony board of directors, we were told that many qualified 
people within the Sony organization could fill the position, and the search was terminated. 
Well, there undoubtedly were many people in the Sony organization who could fill the 
position, but we never saw them. The transfers began: burnout cases, incompetents, relatives of 
high ranking Sony executives, and so on. Each worse than the one before, and each arriving with 
a staff of useless aides. Within two years we had doubled the number of people in our subsidiary 
in Japan with transfers from Sony while our business had increased only 9 percent. It was a 
wonderful example of down-the-food-chain — transferring unwanted people down the 
organization until hopefully they disappear. Unfortunately this "polite" layoff policy can cause 
devastation in subsidiary and supplier companies when transfers find their salaries decreased and 
realize no one really wants to hear from them again. 
The Problem of Foreign Nationals Working for Japanese Corporations 
In a speech before the Japan America Society of California, Gary Shapiro, the head of the 
powerful consumer electronics trade association in the United States, said that one of the major 
problems confronting U.S. nationals working for Japanese corporations is that they are not 
empowered. For the entrepreneur who believes that he is empowered by definition, this is a 
collision course. In my case, even when I did finally get to make decisions, I was not accustomed 
to going through numerous levels of management to do so. It is also interesting to note that 
Japanese U.S. subsidiaries have only 31 percent American managers whereas American 
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companies in Japan have over 80 percent Japanese managers. 
According to Shapiro, Sony is a major exception to the general lack of empowerment 
given American managers in Japanese U.S. subsidiaries. He went on to say, "I desperately do not 
want Sony's experience with top American empowerment to be the precedent Japanese 
companies strive to avoid." Needless to say, I was with Sony during this very, very difficult 
period. That trail of ineptness, blunders and excesses by the American management responsible 
for the Hollywood debacle has been fully documented in books as well as in numerous 
newspaper and magazine articles. What was truly sad was that the movie business consumed 
most of Sony's management attention and resources. Billion dollar losses in Hollywood 
translated into nickel and dime budget-squeezing in other Sony operations. 
Personally, I am not certain that Japanese senior executives really trust foreign nationals 
in management positions. A former CEO of Sony America told me that when Sony was 
preparing to open its first major business unit in France, he mentioned that he had considerable 
experience in that country and could recommend a number of excellent French nationals to run 
the new organization. He was told that the first two or three years would be extremely difficult 
and only Japanese management from Sony could be permitted to run the organization. Perhaps, 
subsequent to the start-up period, they would consider hiring a French national. To me this is 
just another manifestation of the "not-invented-here" syndrome. 
After all, if we define a globalized company as one in which the corporation and its 
management have been transformed into an entity in which it is difficult to discern a single 
country bias, then what difference should the nationality of the managers make in the overall 
scheme of things? And Sony prided itself on being a globalized company - Akio Morita was so 
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desperate to run a globalized company that at one point he wanted to move Sony's headquarters 
from Tokyo to New York. But that is a business school definition of a globalized company; it is 
not reality. The reality is that nationality does matter in choosing overseas managers and this is 
especially so in Japanese corporations. 
The Fundamental Incompatibility Between the Entrepreneur and Working for a Large 
Organization 
Please do not misinterpret my views as negative or unduly biased. Rather they are quite 
positive because people are now willing to speak openly about the problem of foreign nationals 
working for Japanese companies, denoting both concern and a serious desire for remedy. 
In the past Japanese corporate executives have demonstrated superb abilities to adapt to 
changing paradigms. As competition continues to increase in the global marketplace, significant 
changes in their corporate and personal attitudes toward foreign executives must occur if 
Japanese corporations are to continue their present success and meet the challenges of the future. 
Globalized corporations cannot be run by home office managers. 
An American manager working for a Japanese company once said, "If you want an 
interesting experience, come work for a Japanese corporation, but don't set your sights on a long-
term career." Certainly, from a managerial standpoint, Japanese corporations have much to offer. 
I had some very interesting experiences at Sony and learned a great deal. Japanese corporations 
have developed and expanded upon a number of innovative managerial techniques especially in 
manufacturing technologies, many of which have been adapted by U.S. corporations. For 
example, Texas Instruments, a multi-billion dollar electronics giant, brought a large number of 
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Japanese executives from their operations in Japan to teach management techniques to their 
people in Dallas and Houston. I teach a graduate course at Columbia and at Stony Brook for 
engineers and business majors that I call "Technology and Strategy Issues in Manufacturing 
Enterprises." The course material is based on 25 years of U.S. management experience 
combined with my Sony experience. My teaching includes lessons learned from Akio Morita, 
lessons learned from the writings of Genichi Taguchi and the Taguchi method, and of course 
lessons learned from Taichi Ohno of Toyota. 
In conclusion, my career with Sony would have been much fuller and richer if it were not 
for the "not-invented-here" syndrome. Perhaps if I were a person who is non-controversial, does 
not make waves and was seeking a sinecure, I might have derived greater satisfaction from my 
years with Sony. But being an entrepreneur, there was no possibility of this. In fact, I doubt if 
the true entrepreneur could work for any large organization and find happiness and be effective. 
The Japanese oft-quoted saying is that the nail that sticks up will be hammered down. The 
entrepreneur views the nail story from an entirely different perspective. When you trip over the 
nail that sticks up, it makes a lasting impression. 
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